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Many scholars have recently maintained that it is difficult if not impossible to
postulate the definite parting of the ways between Judaism and Christianity in
antiquity. It is argued in this paper that recent criticisms against the ‘parting of the
ways’-model resemble criticisms levelled against the classical identity theory
formulated by Erik H. Erikson. His identity theory emphasises the sense of
personal sameness and historical continuity. In recent decades, however, it has
become common to question whether the notion of unified and consistent self does
justice to diverse social realities in which individuals construct their sense of who
they are. Furthermore, the developmental stage model claims to be universal and
culturally neutral while, as a matter of fact, it is implicitly moralistic and value-
laden. In case of the ‘parting of the ways’-model it has become clear that the
model does not match the evidence showing an intense interaction between
various Jewish and Christian communities during the first centuries CE. In
addition, it has been claimed that the model is not an unbiased historical account
but serves Christian theological interests. Comparing the ‘parting of the ways’-
theory with the Eriksonian identity theory highlights the problems inherent in both
theories. It is suggested that psychological and social-psychological theories
arguing for the flexible and dynamic nature of identity construction are best suited
to describe the emergence of early Christian identity in relation to Jews and
Judaism.
Keywords: identity; social identity; Erikson, Erik H.; Christianity and Judaism
Identity has become a common catchword that is used to describe a variety of
phenomena in different fields of humanities. The word is increasingly used also with
reference to the origins and formation of early Christianity but, more often than not,
with little or no discussion of what the term actually means. According to a minimal
dictionary definition, identity denotes ‘who a person is, or the qualities of a person or
group which make them different from others’ (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/). This
common-sense definition reflects a prevailing idea in many more advanced philosoph-
ical, psychological, sociological, feminist and post-colonialist definitions of identity.
Scholars representing different academic fields have emphasised that individuals and
groups always define themselves in relation to those experienced as different. It has
often been repeated that the ‘Self’ needs the ‘Other’ to define itself, or that the ‘Other’
constitutes the ‘Self’.
If we follow these leads in recent discussions of identity, it is clear that the crucial






















































6  R. Hakola
understood themselves in relation to those who were differentiated and excluded as
others in Christian sources. Different forms of early or proto-Christianity are nowa-
days commonly placed with good reasons in the context of diverse forms of first
century Judaism. This means that it is especially in the discourses and polemics with
other Jews where early Christian self-definition and identity construction first
evolved. In this article, I want to examine whether some recent psychological and
social psychological identity theories could prove helpful in understanding the
dynamics of early Christian identity formation.
1. Christian origins and Judaism: the parting of the ways?
One of the most dramatic changes in the twentieth-century studies of Second Temple
Judaism and early Christianity started with the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls in
the late 1940s. The Scrolls challenged previous ways of understanding Judaism and
Christianity by proving that there was not just one way of being a Jew, but that
Judaism was divided into many different groups having individual beliefs of their
own. New manuscripts also contained many beliefs that had formerly been regarded
as alien to Judaism and characteristic of Hellenistic or Gnostic thinking. For example,
scholars soon found in some of the Scrolls obvious points in common with John’s
dualism earlier taken as evidence of the syncretistic or Gnostic background of the
Fourth Gospel (Hakola 2005, 198–210). These observations were part of an ongoing
and thorough reversal in the search for the context of early Christianity. Early
Christianity was increasingly placed in the context of diverse first-century Judaism,
and early Christians were essentially seen as Jews among other Jews.
The above described change has made all the more complex the question concerning
the alleged separation between Judaism and Christianity. Judith Lieu has emphasised
the elusiveness of this question by saying that ‘it becomes more difficult to understand
why, how, and when, “Christians” could no longer be located [in the diversity of
Judaism], in their own self-understanding or in that of others, or – and this is an impor-
tant distinction – in that of scholars who describe them’ (Lieu 2001, 2).
A conventional solution to this question has long been to identify those topics that
separate Christians from Jews in order to pinpoint a more or less clear date for the
parting of the ways of these two religions. The decisive moment in history has been
variously located in the proclamation of Jesus, the teachings of Paul, the destruction
of the Second Temple in 70 CE or in the aftermath of the Bar Cochba war in 135 CE.
The logic of the ‘parting of the ways’-model is clearly seen in James Dunn’s discus-
sion in his book entitled The partings of the ways between Christianity and Judaism
and their significance for the character of Christianity. In his book, Dunn summarises
the position of the first century Christians by saying that, ‘As we move into the second
century, not only certain Christian sects can be described as “Jewish-Christian”, but
Christianity as a whole can still properly be described as “Jewish Christianity” in a
justifiable sense.’ Dunn also notes, however, a little later in his book, that the letter of
Pliny, dated to 112 CE, shows that ‘the issue was clear: Christians are not Jews. By
then the perception from outside reinforces the impression that the partings of the
ways had already become effective’ (Dunn 1991, 234, 241, original emphasis).
The ‘parting of the ways’-model clearly takes seriously the reassessment of early
Christianity as one of the many forms of first century Judaism and then seeks to trace
the development culminating in the foundation of Christianity as an independent
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internal or external in nature. An example of internal crisis intensifying the separation
between Jews and Christians was the introduction of non-Jews into Christian commu-
nities without demanding that they should be circumcised. The decision that non-Jews
are not obliged to follow Jewish food regulations also pushed Christian congregations
away from many of their fellow Jews. Various discussions in Paul (Gal. 2) and in
other early Christian sources (Acts 15) prove that these evolutions were not smooth
but caused division and disagreement among early Christians. In addition to these
internal forces, there were external crises affecting the growth of Christianity – the
destruction of the Jerusalem and its temple in 70 CE is perhaps the most dramatic one.
Many scholars also want to see the rise of rabbinic Judaism as one of those external
crises with its attempts to ‘draw boundaries more tightly round “Judaism”’ (Dunn
1991, 221–2, 238).
To be sure, the ‘parting of the ways’-model emphasising gradual steps leading to
the final separation of Christianity from Judaism has been called into question in recent
years. Before I proceed to these re-evaluations of the model, I want to stop for a while
and compare the model to how identity construction has been understood in the field
of developmental psychology. I propose that there are clear structural points in
common in how the formation or early Christianity has been visualised and how the
development of personal ego identity has been understood in a classical identity theory.
2. Erikson’s identity theory and the parting of the ways
The classical identity theory was formulated by Erik H. Erikson in a series of publi-
cations beginning from Childhood and society (1950; 2nd edition 1963). Erikson
wrote in the Freudian, psychoanalytic tradition, but, while Freud focused on the
fundamental stages of infancy and operated with the five stages of psychosexual
development, Erikson postulated eight stages that every human being goes through
from birth to death to reach her full development (see Friedman 1999, 149–241). In
his life cycle model, Erikson presented an overall theory of human psychosocial
development that tried to give a due emphasis on the interplay between the inward
development of an individual ego and outward social and cultural stimuli. Each of the
stages in the life cycle model is defined as a conflict or crisis that will result in
a successful resolution if individual learns to hold the extremes of each specific life-
stage challenge in tension.
In his later writings, Erikson complemented the life cycle model with the introduc-
tion of life virtues which are characteristic of each stage and which a person gains as
she goes through the different stages (Friedman 1999, 338–9). For example, ‘trust’
and ‘mistrust’ must both be understood and accepted in order for realistic ‘hope’ to
emerge as a viable solution at the first stage of human development. The names
Erikson gave to different developmental stages reflect the Freudian legacy of his
theory. However, while the Freudian psychoanalytical tradition focused mainly on
alleged childhood traumas, Erikson’s theory marked a break with that tradition by
providing a complete representation of life-long, normal human development. The
stages in the Eriksonian life cycle model and respective extremes and virtues are: (1)
oral sensory: trust vs. mistrust, hope; (2) muscular-anal: autonomy vs. doubt and
shame, will; (3) locomotor-genital: initiative vs. guilt, purpose; (4) latency: industry
vs. inferiority, competence; (5) puberty and adolescence: identity vs. role confusion,
fidelity; (6) young adulthood: intimacy vs. isolation, love; (7) adulthood: generativity





















































8  R. Hakola
One of the basic thrusts in Erikson’s identity theory is the idea that sameness and
continuity are the marks of successful identity formation. According to Erikson, ‘ego
identity is more than the sum of the childhood identifications. It is the accrued
experience of the ego’s ability to integrate all identifications with the vicissitudes of
the libido, with the aptitudes developed out of endowment, and with the opportuni-
ties offered in social roles’. In this way, the sense of ego identity is ‘the accrued
confidence’ in ‘the inner sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others’
(Erikson 1965, 253). In the background of this emphasis are Erikson’s experiences in
the rehabilitation of World War II veterans in the late 1940s. In this connection,
Erikson became aware that traditional psychoanalysis did not have proper diagnostic
terms for normal people who were facing difficulties in their lives. Erikson noticed
that his patients had ‘lost a sense of personal sameness and historical continuity’ and
were experiencing ‘identity crises’, which represented the temporary absence of ‘a
sense of what one is, of knowing where one belongs, of knowing what one wants to
do’ (Friedman 1999, 160–1). The introduction of the term ‘identity crisis’ into
psychological discussion became one of the most well-known aspects of Erikson’s
theory.
At the first glance, it may not seem obvious what this discussion about the personal
psychological development has to do with such historical processes as the making of
early Christianity. However, Erikson himself was renowned as an interdisciplinary
intellectual who did not hesitate to assess various historical, social and cultural
phenomena in light of his identity theory. Many studies have earlier established the
value of Erikson’s theory for the psychology of religion (see Capps 1984, 1997). As
a matter of fact, in one of his last publications, Erikson addressed the issue of the rela-
tion of a self-conscious ‘I’ to others and the Ultimate Other in the context of the study
of the historical Jesus, drawing especially on Norman Perrin’s study Rediscovering
the teaching of Jesus (Erikson 1981). Donald Capps has most recently applied produc-
tively some of Erikson’s insights to Jesus’ healing activity in his Jesus: the village
psychiatrist (Capps 2008, 124–30). Given this genuinely interdisciplinary promise in
Erikson’s publications, it is not contrived at all to find certain phenomenal similarity
between the ‘parting of the ways’-model described above and Erikson’s life cycle
model.
Both these models put a great emphasis on the role of definitive crises in the devel-
opmental process. Crises are seen as possibilities to rise to a new stage in which a
satisfactory and lasting solution to an earlier problem is found. In both of these
models, crises are steps, the true meaning of which can be seen only in light of the
final outcome. In the case of Christianity, this outcome is the formation of indepen-
dent and self-sufficient religion, in the case of identity theory, the formation of ego
integrity.
The emphasis on the final result of a developmental process is seen in how these
theories allow for cases that run against the favoured outcome. In Eriksonian tradition,
failure to integrate different forces in each specific life-stage challenge is regarded as
underdevelopment or even as personality disorder – Erikson himself spoke of ‘identity
diffusion’ (Erikson 1968). In a similar way, the ‘parting of the ways’-model has diffi-
culties to give a positive role for those forms of early Christianity that resist the neat
distinction between a Christian and a Jew still long after these two traditions have
allegedly separated. From the point of view of what later developed into orthodox
Christianity, different ‘Jewish-Christian’ groups are not true Christians at all but they
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In light of these initial similarities, it may not be surprising that recent criticisms
against both the Eriksonian identity theory and the ‘parting of the ways’-model resem-
ble each other. As a Biblical scholar, I am not qualified enough to estimate whether
the criticism levelled against Erikson’s life cycle model has always been justified.
Erikson’s model has been recycled in various publications, and it may be that the
model has become, despite Erikson’s intentions, too rigid and cohesive in the hands
of its popularisers (Friedman 1999, 226–7). Sameness and continuity may not be as
central to Erikson’s original theory as has been presented in the ‘neo-Eriksonian’
psychological literature where the theory has been tested and developed further
(Schachter 2005, 145). I think, however, that it is productive to take a look at some
main points in these criticisms so that we may create more nuanced and appropriate
models to conceptualise the formation of early Christian identity.
3. Re-evaluating Erikson and the parting of the ways
In recent decades, it has been called into question whether consistency and sameness
are as essential to the notion of identity as Erikson’s theory seems to suggest. To be
sure, Erikson was not the first to present these virtues as typical of healthy personality.
Kenneth Gergen has remarked that William James had already described a healthy
person as ‘harmonious and well balanced from the outset’. For James, the only salva-
tion for those who had ‘divided selves’, was the ‘normal evolution of character’ and
the ‘straightening out and unifying of the inner self’ (Gergen 1968, 301). Gergen
suggests that this traditional notion of unified and consistent self – Gergen takes
Erikson as a representative of this tradition – is ill-conceived and needs to be revised
toward a theory of multiple selves. Gergen draws on many empirical studies which
show how a person may adapt her identity to new and changing circumstances and
even behave in antithetical ways without feeling that she is behaving inconsistently
and without losing her subjective sense of integrity (Gergen 1968, 306–7).
It has become all the more common to question whether the notion of unified and
consistent self does justice to diverse social realities in which individuals construct
their sense of who they are. As Elli Schachter has noticed, this question is urgent when
the Eriksonian model is applied in a post-modern context of pluralisation and
complexity where people live in fragmented socio-cultural contexts and are required
to cope with different multifaceted and contradictory tendencies in their self-concepts.
This kind of context demands the flexibility of self-identifications and ‘sameness and
continuity in self-definition become problematic and all the more so the ability to
match the self-image as seen by the individual with the one seen by the significant
others around her’ (Schachter 2005, 141).
In a similar way, one of the main criticisms against the ‘parting of the ways’-model
has been that it does not match with the evidence showing an intense and ongoing
intellectual and social interaction between various Jewish and Christian communities
during the first centuries CE. This view is presented, for example, in many articles in
a book the title of which, The ways that never parted, is a conscious challenge to the
‘parting of the ways’-model. The editors Annette Yoshiko Reed and Adam Becker
summarise the emerging new thinking by saying that ‘Jews and Christians (or at least
the elites among them) may have been engaged in the task of “parting” throughout
Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, precisely because the two never really
“parted”’ (Reed and Becker 2007, 23). In a similar vein, Paula Fredriksen has





















































10  R. Hakola
Christian writers, ‘on the ground, the ways were not separating, certainly not fast
enough and consistently enough to please the ideologues’ (Fredriksen 2007, 61). On
the basis of the evidence for the interaction between Jews and Christians, Daniel
Boyarin has even suggested that we should not think of Christianity and Judaism in
late antiquity as different religions at all but as ‘points on a continuum’ so that ‘on one
end were the Marcionites … and on the other the many Jews for whom Jesus meant
nothing. In the middle, however, were many gradations that provided social and
cultural mobility from one end of this spectrum to the other’ (Boyarin 1999, 8; cf. also
Boyarin 2004, 1–33).
Another major challenge to Eriksonian identity tradition has dealt with how the
developmental stage model claims to be universal and culturally neutral while, as a
matter of fact, it is implicitly moralistic (Friedman 1999, 239). The model prefers
certain modes of being over others by presenting them as natural outcomes of normal
developmental processes. The concept of progress implicit in Erikson’s model
‘implies that change over time is necessarily toward some “higher” or “better” state of
form, and so the terms of development and maturity imply a hierarchical ordering’.
Therefore, it must be asked whether Erikson’s model ‘values one possible develop-
mental path while unnecessarily constraining other possibilities’ (Schachter 2005,
147–489). In his model, Erikson becomes dangerously close to a ‘naturalistic fallacy’
in ‘moving from empirical statements to value judgments’ and in ‘inferring an “ought”
from an “is”’ (Roazen 1976, 118–9).
Erikson’s biographer, Lawrence Friedman, has connected Erikson’s emphasis on
normal human development to the family crisis prompted by the birth of a son suffering
from Down’s syndrome in 1940s. The son was immediately transferred to institutional
care and Erikson and his wife said in public and even to two of their ‘normal’ children
that he had died. In response to the chaos and despair that ‘a developmental freak’
caused, Erikson’s life cycle model became ‘a map of normalcy’ that reaffirmed the
‘healthy’ members of the Erikson family in their own propriety and viability. Accord-
ing to Friedman, the personal background of the life cycle model explains, at least in
part, why the model was able to provide ‘perhaps the most helpful perspective on
universal human development (and certainly the most highly regarded) in the twentieth
century’ (Friedman 1999, 215–20; 2001, 185).
In the case of the ‘parting of the ways’-model it has been asked whether the model
is an unbiased historical account or whether it serves some theological interest. Judith
Lieu has claimed that the model is essentially a Christian model. According to her, the
model seeks to ‘maintain the Christian apologetic of continuity in the face of questions
about that continuity from a historical or theological angle’. The model is based on a
doctrinal definition of Judaism and Christianity in the sense that these religions and
their alleged separation are evaluated in terms of their beliefs only. This ignores the
fact that ‘theological boundaries and social boundaries are not necessarily cotermi-
nous’ (Lieu 2001, 18–9).
In recent decades it has become clearer and clearer that it is historically mislead-
ing, at least in the pre-Constantine era, to speak of normal, mainstream Christianity
and discard some other forms of being a Christian as abnormal and heretical. As
Daniel Boyarin states, the discourses of orthodoxy/heresy are not neutral historical
descriptions but ‘serve the production of ideology, of hegemony, the consent of a
dominated group to be ruled by an elite’ (Boyarin 2004, 27). If we are ready to
abandon the idea that certain formulations of Christian identity are inevitable and
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our canon. For example, Stephen Wilson has suggested that the non-canonical
evidence concerning some Jewish-Christian groups is important because it ‘demon-
strates that the views that Christians took of Judaism were far more diverse than the
monochrome, negative portrait that was later to dominate the Christian tradition’
(Wilson 1995, 141).
4. How to conceptualise the formation of early Christian identities?
The above comparisons have revealed how the Eriksonian identity theory and Biblical
studies on the history of early Christianity have been faced with similar kinds of
challenges. Theoretical models used to describe the processes of self-definition and
identity construction have proved to be too inflexible in multiform social contexts. But
how could we conceptualise the formation of early Christian identity using recent
theoretical discussions on the subject? I list in a preliminary way some theories that
would allow us to take more seriously the multiform evidence concerning the forma-
tion of early Christian identities. It is fair to say that the theories mentioned here are
perhaps not totally contrary to what Erikson wrote of identity. In some of his later
writings, Erikson sensed that contemporary life required a ‘protean personality’ that
is responsive to the self-sustaining change in modern societies. As Lawrence Friedman
has remarked this ‘represented a major shift in Erikson’s perspective on identity’
(Friedman 1999, 410; see also Erikson 1974, 51–60; Lifton 1993).
Edward Sampson has posited the concept of a decentralised identity which is not
arranged in a hierarchical fashion and whose very being hinges on its continuous
becoming (Sampson 1985, 1203–11). Hermans, Kempens, and van Loon have
claimed that the embodied self, in contrast to the typical Western notion of the indi-
vidualistic and rationalistic self, is always tied to a particular position in space and
time. This means that we can not view self-definition and identity construction as
abstract and universal processes but processes deeply rooted in specific historical,
cultural, ecological and social environments. These writers have presented the dialog-
ical self where ‘I has the possibility to move, as in a space from one position to the
other in accordance with changes in situation and time’ (Hermans, Kempens, and van
Loon 1992, 23–33).
Elli Schachter, re-reading Erikson in a pluralistic context, has developed the
concept of ‘identity configurations’ which implies that individuals can construct iden-
tity in more than one way. According to Schachter, different identity configurations
are dependent not only on inner psychological processes but on social and cultural
factors too. From this perspective, the identity is ‘the result of a dynamic process that
involves a complex negotiation between personal objectives and contextual
constraints’ (Schachter 2004, 195).
It is noteworthy that all these psychological theories underscore the importance of
social and cultural factors for the formation of identity. It would be natural, therefore,
to include recent social psychological theories in the search for a valid theoretical
framework to model the emergence of early Christian identity. Hazel Markus and
Elissa Wurf have reviewed social psychological research where the emphasis on the
multidimensionality of the self-concept has made it problematic to speak of the self-
concept. Instead, they emphasise the dynamic nature of self-concept. They speak of
the ‘working self-concept’, which refers to the self-concept of the moment that is a






















































12  R. Hakola
The dynamic and social nature of the self is a key element in the so-called ‘social
identity approach’, which has recently been applied to early Jewish and Christian
sources (Esler 1998, 2003; Hakola 2007, 2008). The ‘social identity theory’ was first
developed by social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues in Great Britain
in the late 1960s and early 1970s and it was later developed into a more general
explanation of all cognitive processes connected to group formation in the so-called
‘self-categorisation theory’ (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Turner and
Reynolds 2001). The social identity approach seeks to find out necessary and suffi-
cient reasons for the emergence of intergroup conflicts and explain the emergence
and function of social stereotypes and prejudice for group identities. It takes social
categorisation as a fundamental aspect of group behaviour which often results in
exaggeration and a polarisation of perception. Social categorisation is seen as depen-
dent on the specific social environment and those comparative relations that are
present in that environment. Therefore, people who are categorised and perceived as
different in one context can be re-categorised and perceived as similar in another
context.
These initial observations suggest that theories highlighting the flexible and
dynamic nature of identity construction are best suited to describe the emergence of
early Christian identity in relation to Jews and Judaism. In light of these theories, we
do not need to play down some obvious features of ambivalence and the signs of both
continuity and discontinuity in early Christian representations of Jews.
The ambivalence of Christian identity is seen, for example, in how Paul re-evaluated
his Jewish heritage. While in some contexts Paul can be highly critical of such central
parts of Jewish identity as the law (Gal. 3), in his discussion in Romans 9:2–5 Paul
expresses his continuing identification with the people of Israel: ‘I have great sorrow
and unceasing anguish in my heart. For I could wish that I myself were accursed and
cut off from Christ for the sake of my own people, my kindred according to the flesh.’
Philip Esler has proposed, from a social identity perspective, that Paul’s ‘passionate
outbursts are the product of his reconnecting with the often dormant but nevertheless
deeply rooted Israelite dimension to his self-concept’. In his career as ‘the apostle to
the non-Jews’, Paul mostly laid aside this aspect of his identity (Esler 2003, 272).
The ambivalence of John’s portrait of Jews and Judaism is captured in two sayings
that have been much discussed in recent decades. In John 8:44, Jesus says to his
Jewish opponents, ‘You are from your father the devil’, a saying that has often been
characterised as one of the most anti-Jewish passages in the New Testament. On the
other hand, Jesus says in John 4:22, ‘Salvation is from the Jews’, a saying that has
recently been taken as a potential corrective to Christian anti-Judaism (see Hakola
2005, 96–112).
There is also evidence later that the positions early Christians took on Jews and
Judaism were not uniform and stable. For example, Origen, at least occasionally when
arguing against his opponents, sides with Jews even though his writings otherwise do
not lack anti-Jewish outbursts. Origen says that the worship of the Jews was superior
to all other forms of worship because the Jews were ‘instructed almost from their
birth, and as soon as they could speak, in the immortality of the soul’ and thus
deserved to be called the ‘portion of God’ (c. Celsum 5.42). Augustine’s interpretation
further exemplifies ambiguities inherent in Christian portraits of Judaism. It has been
claimed that Augustine, influenced in his views of Jews and Judaism especially by
Romans 9–11, was rather moderate and unpolemical compared with some other early
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Ioannis Evangelium Augustine shows that he is capable of the same kind of hateful
and violent language as, for example, Chrysostom and Cyril. Paula Fredriksen has
recently concluded that Augustine’s Johannine Jews in his Tractatus ‘seem a different
tribe from the one encountered in [Augustinus’] Against Faustus’ (Fredriksen 2008,
305). It is clear that any model that is used to conceptualise the Christian identity
formation must allow of these kinds of discontinuities and ambiguities.
Earlier in this article, I have used Erikson’s identity theory as an example that does
not provide a helpful model for visualising the creation of Christian identity. Instead
of taking the lead from what Erikson allegedly said in his theory, we could perhaps be
inspired by the story of Erikson’s own life which is curiously at odds with his empha-
sis on sameness and continuity as trademarks of identity. Especially in relation to his
Jewish background, Erikson was often vague and even self-contradictory. Some of his
critics have even accused him of ‘evasion of his Jewish identity’ which undermines
his claim for a universal identity because if a universal identity ‘can be attained only
by suppressing one’s own particularity’, then it ‘is a phoney universality, built on a
lie, rotten to the core’ (Friedman 1999, 432–33; Friedman cites here Marshall
Berman’s essay in New York Times Book Review in 1975). It is not unusual to see in
Erikson an example of a person who thinks, in spite of his Jewish background, that
‘no positive content can be attached to Jewish identity’ and ‘that there is nothing
within Judaism worthy of being affirmed’ (Whitfield 2002, 164). In his article ‘The
Galilean sayings and the sense of “I”’ Erikson understood Jesus’ teachings as ‘an
event central to our Judaeo-Christian heritage – a step in human comprehension and
self-awareness which is by no means fully expressed in, or restricted to, its ecclesial
fate’. This has been taken as ‘a disturbing suggestion that the advent of Christianity
was an evolutionary step up from Judaism’ (Erikson 1981, 362; Andersen 1993, 64).
However, these criticisms may be one-sided. In his personal correspondence, Erikson
said that he ‘found a healthy unity of soul and body in the tradition of both the Hebrew
Torah and the Christian Gospels’ and ‘that nobody who has grown up in a Jewish
environment can ever be not-a-Jew’ (Friedman 1999, 453–54). Asked once by one of
his friends whether he was a Protestant or Jew, Erikson answered: ‘Why both of
course’ (Friedman 1999, 345). Erikson’s biographer, Lawrence Friedman has
concluded that Erikson, through the story of his life, ‘spoke to the possibilities of
border crossing – the excitement and freedom of shifting ideas, moods, vocations, reli-
gious proclivities, geographic settings, and more’ (Friedman 1999, 478). This may be
a paradoxical summary of the life of a man who was known for his theory emphasising
the need of personal sameness and continuity. This paradox, however, may serve as a
healthy reminder that all our efforts to define and clarify identities – whether past or
present – are bound to remain incomplete and are always potentially frustrated by the
uncertainties of life.
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